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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

A qualitative study of the Interaction between
Maritime Pilots and Vessel Traffic Service
Operators

Degree:

MSc

The aim of this dissertation is to seek knowledge into the area of interaction between
pilots and VTSOs. The reason for this is that there is evidence in the form of
statements by industry people, accident reports and investigations indicating that
there are issues within the interaction that can affect the performance of the two
safety systems in a negative way, and thus resulting in adversed effects on safety at
sea.
During this work a qualitative research in the form of interviews were performed in
order to gain knowledge of this subject. The respondents were VTSOs and pilots in
the Sound. The main findings of this indicates that there are social issues that affect
the interaction between pilots and VTSOs. These social issues reveal themselves in
the form of a strong feeling of group belonging, lack of trust and lack of
communication. In order to enhance the co-operation between the pilots and the
VTSOs, these social issues have to be addressed and properly dealt with. One way to
achieve this could be to train pilots and VTSOs together or to find other effective
means of interaction e.g. common meetings on a regular basis, as this will provide a
better understanding of how the other service functions and it will also be an
excellent chance to get to know each other and thereby building up the trust
KEYWORDS: maritime, pilotage, VTS, co-operation
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1 Introduction
1.1. Safety at sea
To raise or maintain the level of safety in a particular sea-area, a State or an
organisation has the option of implementing different kinds of safety systems. Some
of them can be viewed as being passive (Hughes, 2009, p. 440) e.g. Traffic
Separation Schemes (TSS); others can be denoted as active e.g. pilotage or Vessel
Traffic Services (VTS). It is up to the organisation to decide which system/systems to
implement in order to achieve the desired safety level. In areas that are deemed to
need a high safety level, multiple safety systems can be implemented, and a
combination of the three earlier mentioned is a common choice. This will result in
the fact that different safety systems are active in the same area and with the same
overall goal; moreover, these systems will interact and affect each other. The
interaction between the passive system and the two active ones are rather static;
however, the interaction between the two active ones are dynamic and should be so
in order to achieve the best result. This dissertation will focus on the two active
systems – VTS and pilotage.
Pilotage has a long history of acting as a safety system in areas deemed to propose
difficulties for the navigator of a ship. Typical such areas could be - ports, rivers,
heavily trafficked areas, areas with potential adversed meteorological / hydrological
conditions and/or areas with a highly sensitive environment. VTS, on the other hand,
is a relative new type of safety system compared to pilotage, and is often
implemented in areas already covered by pilot services. The goal for the two services
is to assist ships in their voyage from one geographical position to another in the
safest and most efficient way possible. VTS does this by monitoring the ships in the
assigned sea area, trying to organize the traffic in the safest and most efficient way.
At the same time the pilot is active in that same area on one of the VTS monitored
10

ships. In theory, this would warrant a high level of safety in all situations by having
two independent systems assisting the ship on its voyage. Although the systems are
independent, the nature of work demands that the two systems interact and cooperate to achieve the best result. This interaction is according to the author an area
that needs to be investigated since there has surfaced evidence that points on the fact
that there can arise issues from the interaction that can have negative effect on safety
at sea.

2 Background
The issue of safety at sea is an issue that has got more and more attention recently
due to the rising concern for the environment by the public. Authorities have to take
measures to confine the risk of having an accident that might cause damage to the
environment. Two of the measures that authorities can choose to implement is
pilotage and VTS. These two safety systems are often combined and do often operate
in the same area and on the same object i.e. the ship; moreover, they do it
simultaneously. The fact of having these two systems acting in the same area might,
under certain circumstances, affect each other in a negative way - resulting in that the
desired safety level is not met, this fact is similar to what Perrow describes he's book
Normal Accidents (Perrow, 1999). This issue was first noted by the author during his
work as a VTS operator, employed by the Swedish Maritime Administration. At first
this was perceived as a minor problem by the author and believed to be a local
occurrence. Nevertheless, the issue was raised during discussions with people in the
business, both pilots and VTSOs and it was found that issues rising from the
interaction between pilots and VTS was not a local issue, but rather an issue that was
identified by others working in different regions and countries. Further on, this was
backed up by accident reports that, although not always in a direct way, showed
irregularities in the interaction between pilots and VTS. Moreover, the issue of co-
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operation between pilots and VTS has been raised at two consecutive congresses
organized by the International Maritime Pilots Association (IMPA). During the
XVIth congress held in Hamburg 2002 the IMO Secretary-General W.A. O'Neil
brought forward the question of how the relationship between pilots and shore-based
vessel traffic operators would develop in the future; moreover, he identifies the need
to integrate the VTS into the vessel control team (O'Niel, 2002). In the following
congress held in Istanbul 2004, the now acting Secretary-General Efthimios
Mitropoulos continues on the subject of VTS and pilot co-operation, and states that
in his view the two services are two complementary services; however, Mitropoulus
does recognise that there are opinions among the pilot community that see the VTS
as a threat (Mitropoulos, 2004). To sum up, both the present Secretary-General and
his predecessor do acknowledge the importance of the co-operation between the
growing VTS industry and the pilot service – and they both indicate that a rivalry
between the two services can be found.

2.1. Technical description of the two systems
The two safety systems of VTS and pilotage are widely spread around the globe;
however, it should be noted that the two systems, although governed by international
guidelines and conventions, vary from state to state. Hereunder, a technical
description, which is based on international conventions and guidelines governing
pilotage and VTS, will be presented of the two systems. The aim of this description
is to give the reader a brief knowledge of the two systems of pilotage and VTS,
which is needed to understand further discussions and analysis in this dissertation.

2.2. Pilotage
2.2.1 History of pilot services
Pilotage has a very long history, and the exact origin of pilots are most probably lost
in the same. The notion of pilot is found in the bible in the book of Ezekiel where the
word pilot is used four times, moreover, Homer (Homerus) writes about Thestor the
12

pilot in the first book of Iiiad (Hofstee, 2003). Since the early days of navigation,
ships navigating in or out of ports, or in other areas deemed to propose difficulties in
navigation, has been guided by pilots. These pilots adviced the master of how to
conduct the ship - based on their local knowledge and experience ((U.S.) & Piloting,
1994, p. 30). By doing so pilots have since the beginning of shipping contributed to
safety and efficiency of ship traffic. In Sweden, there are traces found that indicate
that during the 1400th century local inhabitants of the archipelago and sailors did
perform pilot services against payment; however, a more un-organized form of
pilotage is believed to have existed long before this (Hillberg, 2007).

2.2.2 Pilotage of today
As described in previous paragraphs pilotage has a long history, today most coastal
States has laws and regulations that cover the area of pilotage. A pilot of today is still
an adviser to the ship's master and he still possesses a great deal of local knowledge.
According to International Maritime Pilots Association (IMPA) and the European
Maritime Pilots Association (EMPA) the prime obligation for a pilot is:
Assist the master of a ship, by providing local knowledge of navigational and
operational matters combined with specialist ship-handling experience. The pilot
should also be familiar with the local requirements and unique conditions that prevail
in the area. The pilot serves the public by contributing to the overall safety at sea and
thereby the protection of the environment; moreover, the pilot is to contribute to the
free flow of ship traffic in the area (“EMPA main,” 2009; “IMPA - International
Maritime Pilots' Association,” 2009). Pilotage can be divided into different
categories namely, port-pilotage and deep sea pilotage. In port pilotage, the pilot is
onboard for the transit to or from the port, which usually is a shorter period of time,
typically a few hours; in the event of deep sea pilotage, the pilot could be onboard a
ship for a much more extended time that could span over several days.
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2.2.3 Conventions and guidelines governing pilotage
The importance of pilot services was formally recognized by IMO in 1968, when the
organization adopted resolution A.159(ES.IV). The resolution recommends States to
organize pilotage services in areas where such service is likely to be more effective
than other measures. Further, in 1981 IMO adopted resolution A.485(XII), that was
reviewed and replaced by Resolution A 960, Recommendation on training and
certification and on operational procedures for maritime pilots other than deep sea
pilots. This resolution was adopted in 2003 and is in force today. These two
resolutions can be seen as the most important ones. IMO has moreover, produced a
number of documents regarding technical issues with respect to pilotage e.g. in
SOLAS Chapter V there are requirements on how to embark or disembark pilots in a
safe way. IMPA has a consultant status at IMO, and takes an active role in updating
and drafting new/existing guidelines and conventions. Another organisation that
produces guidelines regarding pilotage is EMPA.

2.3. Vessel Traffic Services
2.3.1 Development of VTS
Not long after World War II, it was clear that short range audio-visual aid to
navigation was not sufficient enough to assist ships in their voyage into or from a
port in all weather conditions. This resulted in delays that propagated to other modes
of transport and affected the import export industries of a State. There was a need to
be able to keep ports open in all conditions of visibility and traffic density. The
maritime experts of the time believed that the use of shore-based radar combined
with communications to monitor and organize the traffic could be applied to enhance
the safety and thereby the efficiency in port areas. The first shore-based radar was
implemented in Douglas, Isle of Man in 1948 and was followed by stations in
Liverpool and Rotterdam. These single radar stations were developed, and in 1956
the entire port of Rotterdam was covered by a chin of shore-based radars. The main
objective of these systems was to keep the traffic operating without any delays;
14

however, the issue of safety was also considered, and there were studies conducted
on this topic. The conclusion was that these simple radar systems not only enhanced
the efficiency of the traffic flow - but they also reduced the numbers of accidents in
the area. During the nineteen-sixties and seventies there was a rising concern among
the public with regards to the maritime environment; this concern came from some
major shipping accidents e.g. Torrey Canyon and Amoco Cadiz. The authority's
answer, was to expand and further develop the use of radar surveillance and vessel
traffic management (IALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 2008, p. 14).

2.3.2 VTS of today
As technology was developing, the shore-based radar systems evolved from being a
quite simple system consisting of radar and communication with the aim of
increasing efficiency of shipping in adversed weather conditions, to a highly
advanced system with multiple sensors with the aim of increasing safety at sea,
improving the efficiency of maritime traffic and to protect the environment. Today
there are some 500 VTS systems in use all over the globe and the number will
continue to grow as many coastal states wishes to be protected from any negative
effects of maritime traffic (“Feature: VTS comes of age with increasingly strategic
role - BIMCO,” 2008). According to Resolution A 857(20) produced by IMO, there
are two different kinds of VTS, one is the Port or Harbour VTS and the other one is a
Coastal VTS. The Port VTS is mainly concerned with ship traffic to or from a port,
while a Coastal VTS is mainly concerned with ship traffic passing through the VTS
area. In a VTS area there are different service levels that the VTS can provide the
ship traffic with, these are:
Information Service (INS). An Information Service provides essential and
timely information to assist the on-board decision-making process.

An

Information Service does not participate in on-board decision-making;
Traffic Organisation Service (TOS). A Traffic Organisation Service is a
service to provide for the safe and efficient movement of traffic and to
15

identify and manage potentially dangerous traffic situations.

A Traffic

Organisation Service provides essential and timely information to assist the
on-board decision-making process and may advise, instruct or exercise the
authority to direct movements;
Navigational Assistance Service (NAS). A Navigational Assistance Service
may be provided in addition to an Information Service and/or Traffic
Organisation Service. It is a service to assist in the on-board navigational
decision-making process and is provided at the request of a vessel, or when
deemed necessary by the VTS. A Navigational Assistance Service provides
essential and timely navigational information to assist the on-board decisionmaking process and may inform, advise and/or instruct vessels accordingly.
(IALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 2008, p. 63)
The development of VTS are still very much ongoing and at the time of writing,
there are processes that aim to develop a concept called Vessel Traffic Management
(VTM) which is an enhanced VTS service that aims to incorporate more services into
the VTS systems. Such services could be maritime security, law enforcement, and
search and rescue (SAR).

2.3.3 Conventions and guidelines governing VTS
During the development of VTS, there was a need for international harmonisation
and the issue was brought forward to Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organisation (IMCO), the predecessor of International Maritime Organisation
(IMO). A resolution, A.587(14) was produced and adopted encompassing the
implementation and it provided the framework for further harmonisation. The
requirements brought forward in the resolution were considered by the International
Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA)
together with the International Maritime Pilots Association (IMPA) and the
International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH). During the mid-1990's the
resolution was updated and a new resolution was adopted, A.857(20). This new
16

resolution is internationally recognized to be the source policy document of VTS.
IALA has become the organisation that deals with VTS issues and holds a
consultative status at IMO. VTS are also governed by other conventions, in IALA's
VTS manual the conventions that have relevance to VTS are listed (Table 1).
Moreover, IALA has produced several documents that are relevant to VTS and they
are compiled in a publication called IALA VTS Manual. The content of the manual
spans over technical issues to issues regarding the training and certification of VTS
personnel.

Table 1: IMO Conventions that have relevance to VTS
Source: (IALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 2008, p. 31)
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2.4. The evidence that builds the case
When trying to validate this research, several sources of information have been used;
however, it has proven difficult to find sources that can be used as “hard” evidence.
During the research it has not been possible to find any recent academic writings
regarding the specific issue of interaction between pilots and VTS; however, there
are other documents and reports that touch upon the subject. These sources of
information can, when scrutinized from the pilot – VTS interaction point of view,
provide information that helps to underpin this research.

2.4.1 Customer research ordered by SMA
During 2008 the Swedish Maritime Administration ordered an investigation to be
made regarding the customer's view on the services rendered by the administration.
The investigation was conducted by Statistiska Centralbyrån, Statistics Sweden, and
the target group was ships agents, ships officers and pilots. It should be noted that
pilots are employed by SMA and are therefore not a customer; however, they are
using all the services that were to be investigated. The services that were dealt with
in this investigation were Fairways, VTS and Sea charts. The main results were
presented in the form of a grade index that ranges from 0-100. A grade index below
40 can be classed as not satisfactory; the limit for satisfactory are at 55 and a grade
index of more than 75 can be viewed as very satisfactory.

18

Overall index

Availability

Treatment

Information

Performance

Figure 1: Pilots overall index
Source: (SCB Pilots Survey, 2009, p. 5)

The overall result of the part where pilots got to evaluate VTS was 39, which can be
seen as not satisfactory. The result is presented in Figure 1.In the model analysis
made the factors regarding Information and Performance are deemed to be prioritized
to improve the service (SCB Pilots Survey, 2009). The pilot's assessment of VTS
clearly shows that they are not satisfied with the function of VTS services in Sweden.
This could be seen as evidence that VTS services in Sweden are not performing in a
satisfactory way. However, the results from the survey where ships officers evaluated
VTS are quite different. In the results of that survey VTS got an overall index of 74,
which according to the index is satisfactory and it is very close to be classified as
very satisfactory (75) (SCB Ships Officer Survey, 2009) . The results are presented in
Figure 2.
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Overall index

Availability

Treatment

Information

Performance

Figure 2: Ships officers overall index
Source: (SCB Ships Officer Survey, 2009, p. 3)

In the model analysis, the factor regarding Information is deemed to be prioritized to
improve the service. In conclusion, the results suggest that the VTS service is not
satisfactory according to the pilots, while the ships officers give the VTS a rather
high overall index.

2.4.2 Accident reports
There are few accident reports that investigate the relationship between VTS and
pilots as a contributory factor to the development of an accident. During the literature
research contact was made with accident investigation organisations, such as the
Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate’s Marine Casualty Investigation Division and
the organisation responsible in United Kingdom, Marine Accident Investigation
Branch (MAIB) asking for help to find relevant accident reports. The result of that
request was not very fruitful, as it seems that the area of interaction between VTS
and pilots is an area that often just is described and not analysed in the accident
investigation. The reason for this might be that the accident investigation used do not
20

extend into organisational issues.

The collision between Audacity and Leonis
One of the few accidents found during the literature review for this dissertation that
points out the area of interaction between pilots and VTS, is the report of the
collision of the Audacity, a product tanker loaded with gas oil, and the Leonis, a
general cargo ship. The accident occurred in 2007 in the approaches to river Humber
in the United Kingdom. At the time of the accident there was poor visibility in the
area and both ships had pilots onboard. Luckily, there was only structural damage as
a result, but it is easy to imagine the potential negative impact on the environment if
the gas oil carried by the Audacity had escaped into the environment. In the analysis
made by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) critic was issued against
the Humber VTS for being passive. In the conclusion of the report it is stated that:
VTS operators did not consider they were able to give advice and guidance to
vessels with pilots on board. It was considered that the pilot would know
what he was doing and that the operator did not need to be further involved
once a pilot was on board (MAIB, 2008, p. 36).
This indicates that the VTSO was reluctant to assist a ship with a pilot onboard,
although the operating procedures of Humber VTS stated the following:
Thus, if he observes that a vessel is navigating unsafely and is, for example,
about to run aground or perhaps to collide with another vessel then he has a
duty to do everything in his power to prevent a mishap taking place. In doing
so, however, he should avoid giving direct pilotage advice if at all possible.
(MAIB, 2008, sec. Annex 8)
Moreover, IMO Resolution A.857(20), clearly states in paragraph 2.3.4, that
21

instructions are to be given to the master or the pilot.

The allision between Cosco Busan and the San Francisco–Oakland
Bay Bridge
The allision between Cosco Busan and the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge is
another accident where the accident investigation reflects up on the involvement of
both pilot and the VTS. The investigation was carried out by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
On the 7 November, 2007, Cosco Busan was outbound from the Port of Oakland
with a pilot onboard. The Cosco Busan was intended to transit under the San
Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge between the delta-echo span; however, Cosco Busan
made a navigational error which resulted in contact with one of the bridge pylons.
The contact resulted in a long and wide gash in the hull, allowing fuel oil to escape
into the sea. Prior to the allision, the VTSO on duty noticed that the Cosco Busan
was deviating from its intended route, and approximately three minutes before the
allision took place the VTS radioed the pilot on the VHF, and asked him for his
intentions. NTSB concludes in their accident report that the probable cause of the
accident was due to;
the failure to safely navigate the vessel in restricted visibility as a result of (1)
the pilot’s degraded cognitive performance from his use of impairing
prescription medications, (2) the absence of a comprehensive pre-departure
master/pilot exchange and a lack of effective communication between the
pilot and the master during the accident voyage, and (3) the master’s
ineffective oversight of the pilot’s performance and the vessel’s progress
(NTSB, 2009, p. Xi) .
Although the report in its conclusion of the probably cause does not involve the VTS
22

as a contributory factor, the report identifies and evaluates the actions taken by the
VTS. In the conclusion under the findings section it is stated in bullet point number
13 and 15 that:
13. Vessel Traffic Service San Francisco personnel, in the minutes before the
allision, provided the pilot with incorrect navigational information that may
have confused him about the vessel’s heading.
15. Although Vessel Traffic Service San Francisco personnel should have
provided the pilot and the master with unambiguous information about the
vessel’s proximity to the Delta tower, the Safety Board could not determine
whether such information, had it been provided, would have prevented the
allision (NTSB, 2009, p. 134).
The pilot onboard the Cosco Busan has a different view, in the submission made by
the pilot, commenting on NTSB draft report it is stated that a correct warning even if
it is communicated in a late stage would have made a big difference. According to
the pilot, he would have had time to alter the course and pass the bridge in a safe way
(Bornstein & Quiroz, 2008, p. 19). The fact that the VTS did not perform as intended
and that it communicated the wrong information lead to the situation that one of the
board members voted against the results of the investigation. The reason stated for
voting against the report was mainly due to the fact that the VTS, even though they
where closely monitoring the ship, did intervene in an earlier stage.
If one scrutinizes the accident from a pilot - VTS point of view, one might propose
the following questions:
•

The VTS did monitor the ship's transit and they were aware of the intended
route, still there was no communication with the ship until 3 minutes before
the allison. Why did the VTS not intervene at an earlier stage? Was it because
23

there was a pilot onboard?
•

Why did the pilot not utilize the VTS as an aid when he discovered that the
radar was not working properly, and he was in doubt of the position of the
ship?

3 Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold, firstly it will illuminate and analyse the
interaction of pilots and vessel traffic operators. Secondly, it will try to identify the
origin of the found issues, and thirdly, it will propose some recommendations on how
the interaction might be improved to gain safer seas.
There are two key questions that this dissertation aims to answer, those are;
− How do pilots and VTSO perceive the co-operation between them?
− Are there issues related to the interaction between VTS and pilots that could
affect safety at sea?

4 Method
The issues relating to the interaction between VTSO and pilots was identified by the
author through the experiences of working on daily bases with the two groups. These
issues were deemed important to understand to be able to improve both services, and
thereby contribute to a safer sea. Further, it is the believed by the author that the main
area to address in this issue lies within the area of social science and more precise in
the interpersonal interaction between the two service providers i.e. pilots and VTSO.
When consulting different research methods, the method of Case Study was found to
be the most appropriate one to use in the quest of gaining knowledge of this subject.
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4.1. Description of the Case study Method
The main cause for choosing Case Study as method is that it can, according to
Merriam, help the researcher gain in depth understanding of a certain situation and
how the people involved perceive that same situation. Moreover, it is suitable to
tackle problems that need to be understood before one can improve the practice
(Merriam, 1988). This view is also shared by Patton who claims that Case Study is
useful when one wants to understand a problem in great depth and when a few
samples can be used to learn a great deal (Patton, 1987, p. 19). Merriam concludes
after comparing five author's definitions of case study that the fundamental features
of a case study are – particularistic, descriptive, heuristic and inductive (Merriam,
1988, p. 26).

4.2. Literature review
The literature used was drawn from various sources, such as books, conference
proceedings, seminars, research reports, accident reports, peer reviewed journals,
periodicals, class handouts, data bases, incident reports from Sound VTS and the
internet. The literature review has been done in two phases. Firstly a scooping
literature review was made to investigate if there were earlier academic writings on
the subject. The result of that search was that no previous academic papers or other
document was found. Secondly, a search of other relevant information sources that
could be used was performed; this search included contact with international key
persons in the specific area of VTS and pilotage asking them for assistance in the
search. Although there were no previous academic writings found, there are
areas/subjects that are closely related to this subject. One such area is the issue of
Shore Based Piloting (SBP), which is currently under discussion in many European
countries; therefore, literature on that subject was used as a source of information.
The aim has been to acquire a wide range of literature and to use the most recently
25

and up to date information.

4.3. Interviews
The aim of the interviews was to gain understanding of how the respondents
perceived the interaction between pilots and VTSOs. According to Patel and
Davidsson, the use of a qualitative interview method is most appropriate to obtain
such understanding (Patel & Davidsson, 2003, p. 78). There are different forms of
qualitative interviews that could be applied; these forms ranges from an open form to
a structured form. To be able to gather specific information from all respondents a
semi-structured interview was applied. These interviews are controlled by a number
of questions that are open-ended. The semi-structured interviews are based on the
individual respondents defining their reality in different ways. The aim of the
interview is thus not to force the respondents to adopt the researcher's categorisation
of the world (Patton, 1980 as cited in Merriam, 1988, p. 88). The questions were
drafted by the author based on pre-knowledge and information obtained during
literature review of the subject. In the process of interviewing for this research notes
were taken during the interviews, and they were recorded with a dictaphone. When
interviews are used to gather the data the conclusions will be, to some degree, built
up on self-reported data – the respondents make a conscious choice of what to
answer and what not to answer (Lantz, 1993, p. 15). Moreover, when transcribing
interviews, there is a risk that information is since the spoken words and the written
words are not really the same; there are nuances in the spoken language that can be
lost when it is transcribed in written words (Patel & Davidsson, 2003, p. 104). This
is the nature of interviewing; however, care has been taken to limit the effect of the
latter. To validate the interviews and to make the questions as objective as possible, a
modified Delphi method was used when constructing the questions.
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4.3.1 Delphi Method
The Delphi concept was developed in the early 1950s under a U.S. Air Force study
headed by the Rand Corporation. The scope of the study was how to use the opinions
of experts. Out of this study the Delphi method was developed and is currently
widely used. There are several forms of the Delphi method existing today; one of
them can be denoted as the conventional Delphi. This conventional Delphi method is
a paper-and-pencil exercise and can in short be summarized as follows:
A team develops a questionnaire which is sent to a bigger group called the
respondent group, when the questionnaire is returned, it is evaluated by the team and
a new questionnaire is produced and sent out including the feedback made by the
respondent group. The respondents group are usually given at least one opportunity
to re-evaluate their original answers that have been evaluated by the team.
This will according to Linstine and Turoff facilitate a structured group
communication process that allows a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a
complex issue (Linstone & Turoff, 1975, p. 3).
The use of the Delphi method when developing the questions for the data collection
was done to limit the influence of the author and to produce questions that are the
result of a group of experts in the field, thereby providing validity to the interviews.
The Delphi method used for this dissertation is modified to fit the specific purpose
better. The author has drafted the questions based upon the initial research
performed, and then sent them out to a group of experts chosen by the author. The
expert group has then made their comments and sent the questions back to the author,
and the comments have been considered when drafting the final interview questions.
The members of the expert group consisted of the following persons:
– Martina Bach, CEO, Inquiring Relations
– Anders Alestam, Area Manager of South Coast Maritime Traffic Area
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– Jens-Uwe Schröder, Associate Professor at World Maritime University
– Michael Manuel, Phd canditate
– Per Baek Hansen, Danish VTS Manager
Great care should be taken when construction questions according to de Vaus, in his
book Surveys in Social Research, it is suggested that 6 broad principles should be
observed when designing questions. These 6 principels are: reliability, validity,
discrimination, response rate, same meaning for all respondents and relevance. These
principles have been considered when finalizing the questions; moreover, de Vaus
proposes a check list to be used when wording the questions which also has been
followed in the construction of the final questions (Vaus, 2002, p. 97). The final
questions used were:
1

What is the purpose of your job?

2

Describe the purpose for the VTS/pilotage.

3

How do you see your job changing in the future due to e.g. technological,
administrative or other issues?

4

What information do you need to receive from VTS/pilot in order to be able
to do your job?

5

How helpful is the current information offered to you by VTS/Pilot?

6

How would you describe the relationship between pilots and VTSO?

7

Have you experienced difficulties in the co-operation between pilots and
VTS?

8

How do you perceive the communication between VTS and Pilots?

9

What factors do you think affects the communication between pilots and
VTS?

10 In what way do pilots and VTS services complement each other?
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11 Are you utilizing VTS/pilot as an information source in your job?
12 In which way would you enhance the co-operation between pilots and VTS?
The questions were asked in the order they are presented above. In addition to the
questions, the respondents were informed that after the last question, they would be
able to comment on additional issues that they thought was of importance to this
study. Before the interviews started, the respondents were informed about the topic
of the study and they all signed a Volunteer Consent Form, where it was stated how
the data was going to be used and that the interview was conducted in anonymous
and confidential way. All the interviews were conducted in a good climate and cooperative manner, where the author felt that the respondents were responsive in a
very positive manner; moreover, there was felt to be a genuine understanding of the
subject and the issues related to the same. Moreover, it were perceived that the
VTSOs had a slightly bigger interest in this subject, this is based on that the amount
of answers that were given and the length of the discussions during the interviews.
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4.3.2 Method for data collection and analysis
The interviews were conducted between 2009-07-22 to 2009-07-28, and the location
for the interviews was at the SMA Pilot stations in Malmö and Helsingborg. A total
of ten interviews were conducted, 5 VTSO and 5 pilots. The total number of pilots
employed at Malmö or Helsingborg pilots stations is 16, and the total number of
VTSO employed in Sound VTS is 14. The pilots are employed by SMA and their
working area is mainly the Sound. The VTSOs are employed by SMA and the
Danish Maritime Safety Administration and they all work in Sound VTS. Both pilots
and VTSO answered the same 12 questions. To select the respondents the author
interviewed the pilot or the VTSO that was working the day of the interview. Since
the author did not have any pre-knowledge of the duty roaster, this can be seen as a
form of random selection.
The collection and analysis in a qualitative case study such as this, is not a linear
process, because the collection and analysis of information do occur simultaneously
according to (Merriam, 1988, p. 133). The interviews conducted generated a vast
amount of data to be analysed. The chosen method used to analyse was to organize
the data into themes or categories. This organisation of the data was based on the
notes taken during the interviews; the notes were first transferred from the hand
written paper into a clean written document on the computer, this were conducted
directly after the interview, and if there were any questions or unclear notes the audio
recordings were consulted to clarify any unclear statements. When all the interviews
were conducted, the process of intensive analysis started. The data was put into case
narratives (presented in Chapter 5), one for pilots and one for VTSOs. The purpose
of writing case narratives were twofold. Firstly, it serves the purpose of presenting
the results from the interviews to the reader; secondly, during the process of writing
the Case Narratives regularities and phenomenons that reoccurred were identified.
This process created 4 themes as presented in Chapter 6. These 4 themes were then
used as the base for the discussion and analysis.

30

4.4. Limitation
The size of this research is limited, it was only Sound VTS and the Swedish pilots in
the Sound who were subject to the data collection; therefore, the interviews only
allow limited conclusions to be drawn. To be able to get a broader perspective of the
issues the data collection needs to be extended to include other pilot and VTS areas
in Sweden and preferably in other countries. There are also limitations regarding the
gathering of data, which were briefly described previously in paragraph 4.3.

5 Case narratives
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of the result
obtained from the interviews that were conducted. This follows the thoughts of
Kvale, who states that narratives can be used as a method of structuring and
presenting the results from interviews (Kvale, 1996, p. 274). Moreover, the case
narratives serves the purpose of structuring the data into themes or issues which
were discussed in Chapter 4.3.2. The case narratives is the product of the answers
provided during the interviews, out of which 4 different themes have surfaced. These
themes are:
•

Current and future views on VTS and Pilotage

•

Information

•

Communication

•

The relationship and co-operation

Hereunder these 4 themes will be presented in a narrative way and in Chapter 6 they
will be discussed and analysed.
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5.1. VTS operators
5.1.1 Current and future views on VTS and Pilotage
Derived from question 1, 2, 3
The overall impression after interviewing the VTSOs working at Sound VTS is that
it is a group of people that are highly qualified for their tasks. They all have a master
mariner exam and all of them have experience as OOW from various ships. Further,
they deem themselves to be amply experienced and trained to perform the tasks
involved in their work. The purpose of their job is to monitor and assist ships in the
VTS area with the main intention of hindering accidents from occurring and thereby
increase safety at sea, which in turn will protect the environment. The VTSOs view
on pilotage has a lot in common with the view they have of their own jobs.
According to them, the prime reason for a ship to take onboard a pilot is to increase
safety, because the pilot will contribute to this by advising the master on how to
conduct the ship based on the knowledge that the pilot has. The pilot is regarded to
be a highly qualified expert, with vast knowledge of the local area. Moreover, the
VTSOs are of the opinion that pilotage is a service that is good and that it will raise
the level of safety for the ship; moreover, pilotage is a service that will be around in
the foreseeable future. When questioned about their future as VTSOs the answers
were positive, although it was recognized that the future is in the hands of politicians
- but since history has proven that Sound VTS are effective there are very good
chances that the decisions will be in favour of the VTS. Moreover, it is thought that
VTS services are a growing industry all over the world and it is the way of the future.
The services of Sound VTS will expand with regards to both the size of the area and
the service level, which is something that is perceived as positive and will change the
work for the VTSOs. An expansion of the system will require more education and
better technological equipment. There seems to be an overall positive attitude
towards technology, since it is believed that better technology will help the VTSO to
perform their tasks better. The fact that Sound VTS as it is operated today is a
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voluntary system providing Information Service is something that can be a hinder for
the VTSOs in their work. There is a feeling that what they do is not for real, because
ships can choose not to participate in the VTS system. They wish to have more
power in the form of navigational assistance to be able to fulfil their tasks in a
satisfactory and optimized way. Although the VTSOs are exited about the future and
the increase of the service level, there are concerns that this might have negative
implications on the relationship with the pilots.

5.1.2 Information
Derived from question 4, 5, 11
Information exchange is the primary interface between VTS and pilots. According to
the VTSOs, the information needed from the pilots is the same information that is
required from any other ship i.e. there is no additional information needed just
because there is a pilot onboard. Information that could be useful for the VTSO from
pilots or any other ship is information about issues that they cannot perceive on their
displays, e.g. information about malfunctioning navigational aids, visibility in the
area, the technical status of a ship, if a ship is behaving in an unusually manner and
obstacles in the fairway. This type of information the VTSO can obtain from any ship
in the area; however, if it is reported from a pilot, the information is regarded as more
trustworthy. The fact that the information from a pilot is perceived as more
trustworthy is explained by the assumption that the pilot has a feeling of
responsibility for the area in which he serves. It is deemed by the VTSO that the need
of information exchange lies more in the interest of the pilot rather than in the
interest of the VTS.

5.1.3 Communication
Derived from question 8, 9
The information is transferred by means of VHF communications between the VTS
and the pilot. This communication is according to the VTSO very good, it is short,
professional and precise. This is believed to be the result of both pilots and VTSOs
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are similar background and culture. To have the same background is a big advantage
when communicating, as it creates a better understanding of each other. It is
recognized that there are certain factors that affect the communication such as
stressed situations or when external factors like e.g. weather conditions are
challenging. Another factor affecting the communication is personal issues in the
form of competitive or rival interest between the two services.

5.1.4 The relationship and co-operation
Derived from question 6, 7, 10, 12
The relationship between pilots and VTSOs is a relationship over distance; it is rare
that they meet face to face. Although not demanded by the operative procedures of
Sound VTS, most VTSO's do check if the ship has a pilot onboard because a ship
with a pilot onboard gives the VTSO a feeling of safety, which makes it possible to
take away focus from that ship for a bit longer time than a ship without a pilot. It is
felt by the VTSOs that there is a professional relationship between the two - this
relationship is based on their common background as sailors and the fact that both
parties are trained in the local area i.e. the VTS area. The VTSOs have experienced
some negative issues in relationship that stems from a feeling of being ignored by the
pilots – there is a feeling of not being accepted by all pilots in the area. Moreover,
there is noted a difference in the relationship and acceptance of the VTS system
between the Swedish pilots compared with the Danish pilots. It is felt that the
Swedish pilots have accepted the VTS but not all their Danish colleagues have. The
co-operation as it is today is limited to smaller standard issues, such as providing the
pilots with the current water level and other technical information. It is similar to the
co-operation that exists with all the vessels participating in the VTS system.
However, it is recognized that there are common areas that could be explored and
enhanced to make the two services complement each other in a better way, and
thereby increasing the level of safety. According to the VTSOs, the pilots are the
eyes on the sea, although the equipment in Sound VTS is deemed to fulfil the needs
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of the tasks to perform, it can never give the real picture of what is happening in the
area with regards to certain details. It is in such special situations that the pilots can
be a complement to the VTSO. There is also a sense that the VTSO can be a good
complement to the pilot since the VTSO has the overall view of the area and that he
has the history of the area.

5.2.

Pilots

5.2.1 Current and future views on VTS and Pilotage
Derived from question 1, 2, 3
The overall purpose with pilotage is to sail a ship from one geographical point to
another in the safest and most efficient way possible, and by doing so preserving the
environment. The task of a VTS is to monitor the ship traffic and to assist ships with
information that can be used by the bridge team; such information can be e.g. water
level, wind speed and direction and ship movements in the area. There seems to be a
positive attitude towards technology by the pilots because the new technology aids
the pilots in their tasks and add to the overall safety. However, the pilots do at the
same time, place most of the trust in their own knowledge, and do acknowledge that
to much technical aids might take away the focus from the core task. The fact that the
ships today are equipped with better and newer technology will not affect their job
since the crews on the ships are not adequately trained to take advantage of the same.
However, the technological development can propose a change to their work in the
form of SBP. The notion of SBP is by the pilots perceived as a service that will not
function in practice, at least not in their operative area of the Sound. There is a
feeling of uncertainty of what the future holds; this is due to the fact that there are
several ongoing investigations with the aim of investigating alternative forms of
pilotage. This alternative forms could for instance be SBP or the privatization of the
pilotage services in Sweden. Moreover, there are big organizational changes within
the SMA that most probably will change the future for the pilots.
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5.2.2 Information
Derived from question 4, 5, 11
The need for information from the VTS to the pilot is very limited; in fact the pilots
already have the information which they get from the same source as the VTS. The
information flow should be of a dynamic sort, i.e. it is affected by the type and size
of the ship that is being piloted, and of the prevailing meteorological and
hydrological circumstances. It is stated that there are certain special circumstances
when it might be a need for information exchange; those circumstances could e.g. be
if there is a grounded ship in the fairway that is affecting the pilots voyage, a
hampered ship in the fairway or if there is any inoperative navigational aids. It is also
stressed that the information that is received from the VTS has to be correct
otherwise it is useless.

5.2.3 Communication
Derived from question 8, 9
The communication is limited, but when it occurs it is short, positive and
professional. The fact that all communication is performed in English and the
Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP) are used is perceived as positive.
There is a favour amongst the pilots for the concept of silent VTS1. The pilots have
noted that inter-ship communication most often is performed outside the VTS VHF
frequencies. The background of the VTSOs is a factor that affects the communication
in a positive way, as it gives a feeling of having the same language i.e. a good
understanding of each other. Stress is deemed to be a factor that can affect the
communication in a negative way for example, the VTS might call when the situation
onboard is stressed and this increases the level of stress.

1 This means a VTS system without any mandatory reporting points.
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5.2.4 The relationship and co-operation
Derived from question 6, 7, 10, 12
The relationship between pilots and VTSOs is regarded as being OK, but it is a
vague relationship. There are some pilots that recognize that a few pilots other than
themselves have difficulties in the relationship with the VTS. The co-operation is
regarded as OK; however, there is very little co-operation between VTS and pilots.
One negative issue that affects the co-operation is all the standard reporting
therefore, if a Silent VTS were implemented, this negative issue would disappear and
this would favour co-operation. The fact that VTS has the overall view of the area
and that the pilot is physically present on the ship is deemed to be a circumstance
that makes the two services complementary to each other. Both parties are perceived
to be service organisations with the intention to serve maritime traffic. There are
suggestions that there might be a difference in the hierarchy between the two parties,
which can affect the relationship and the co-operation, although the background of
the VTSO's erases that hierarchy to a certain degree. Another factor that is deemed to
affect the co-operation and the relationship is the fact that pilots and VTSOs do not
know each other in person since they have never meet.
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6 Discussion and analysis
6.1. The themes
The themes that have been developed will hereunder be discussed and analysed. It
should be noted that all the themes are interconnected in one way or the other and
they all affect each other; moreover, each theme itself is an area that calls for a
deeper analysis in order to gain thorough knowledge of the subject. The chosen
approach here is to analyse and discuss the themes in an isolated way; this is due to
reasons of simplicity and the fact that a deeper analysis is not that aim for this
dissertation. In this section there is text that is in italic font, which indicates that it is
a statement/comment that is derived directly from the interviews.

6.1.1 Current and future views on VTS and pilotage
When the pilots and the VTSOs were asked about the purpose of their jobs, they gave
similar answers like e.g. Contribute to safety when a ship is sailing to or from a port
or in a fairway and that the overall goal is to avoid accidents. Further on, the
answers showed that one of the main objectives with the service provided was to
preserve the environment. This is in line with the Resolutions A960(23) and
A857(20); moreover, it is in line with the goals set for the services by SMA
(“Sjöfartsverket - Maritime Traffic Information,” 2009; “Sjöfartsverket - Pilotage,”
2009). However, it was also recognized by the respondents that in addition to the
safety perspective, the services aim at improving the efficiency of ship traffic,
meaning that the ships should have a safe and fast passage with as few delays as
possible. The two goals of safety and efficiency might propose implications on one
and another. In the book Normal Accident Theory, Perrow states, although in the
context of Air Traffic Control, that organising traffic in the most efficient way might
be in conflict with safety standards (Perrow, 1999, p. 158). This conflict of goals, is
apparent in the maritime industry as well, and the areas of pilotage and VTS are no
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exception. For example, the pilot can be subject to economical pressure from the
ships owner, which could take the form of pressure from the agent acting on behalf
of the owner requiring, that the ship should be berthed although the conditions might
not be safe according to the pilot. The VTSO meets similar problems in the daily
work, if the operator has the power to close a port due to e.g. bad visibility, this will
have an economic impact on the ships and their owner. The conflict between safety
and efficiency is well known; it was e.g. identified by the managers of E.I. du Pont
de Nemours Powder Company in the beginning of the twentieth century. However, is
there really a conflict? – To be safe is to be efficient - to have an accident will impact
negative on the efficiency. This was also the result of the above mentioned
experiments and the management shifted focus from efficiency towards promoting
safety, which resulted in an overall better efficiency (J. C. Wood & M. C. Wood,
2002, p. 283). The balance between efficiency and safety is a constant struggle, a
struggle that needs to be acknowledge by the management.
The only real difference between pilots and VTSOs when they were asked to
describe the purpose of their job was that the VTSOs considered themselfes more as
a service organisation than the pilots did. This is underpinned by the answers given
on the question where they were asked to describe the purpose with the opposite job
(i.e. the pilots described the purpose of VTS and vice versa). It is clear that the pilots
see VTS as a service to them and other ships, and this is also in line with the VTSO's
views of their job.
New and existing technology has a great impact on both services, which was
acknowledged by respondents from both groups. Technology is in the center of the
operations in a VTS Centre of today, because almost all tasks are performed with the
aid of technological equipment (Jean-Hansen, Sagberg, Hoff, & Brotnov, 2005) This
makes the relationship between VTSOs and technology to be something natural. This
were mirrored in the interviews, as it was clear that the VTSO's were positive
towards technology, new technology will help us to offer a better service and new

39

technology will make our job more easy are typical statements during the interviews
with the VTSOs. The pilots on the other hand are generally positive towards
technology, although in a more sceptic way. They are satisfied with the technical aids
that they are using today, and they believe that they do increase the safety margin.
However, pilots acknowledge that there are risks involved in the fast development of
new and existing technological aids, and as one pilot stated there is a risk with all
technology that we are to use – one might lose focus on the core task. Moreover, the
pilots did make a connection between technological development and the possibility
of SBP to evolve from the drawing table into a service that will be used in practice.
The issue of SBP is something that the pilots believe will not work in practice, and it
is a clear threat to their livelihood. The pilots emphasises the need for better training
of the crews onboard ships if they are to be able to take advantage of the technical
aids and thereby be able to sail without a pilot on board or in a SBP system, or as one
pilot put it: the work of a pilot will not change as long as the crew do not know how
to utilize the technology onboard.
Both groups of respondents believe that their profession will be around in the future;
the overall judgement by the VTSOs regarding the future was that their future is in
the hands of politicians, but with comments like: VTS services will not go away in
the future, VTS is a service that are growing all over the world and our existent are
proved by history It is obvious that there is a strong belief in the future development
of VTS Services. The pilots did give voice to a more mixed view of the future, as it
was recognized that protecting the environment is an issue that is high on the
political agenda and it can advocate the need for pilots. The fact that the crews on the
ships are poorly trained are another issue in favour for the pilot business. On the
other hand, concerns were raised about how the ongoing organisational changes
within the SMA would affect the pilots, and there was a concern that they might be
privatized in a not to far away future. Moreover, several investigations have been
made on how to make pilotage more efficient by means of using new technology and
by reconstructing the forms and regulations for pilotage. The most extensive one was
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ordered by the Swedish government with the purpose to:
review certain piloting issues (ToR 2006: 116). The remit has included
showing how new technology can facilitate and streamline pilotage services
and examining the possibilities of developing pilotage from a land-based
centre (Bjelfvenstam, 2007, p. 25).
This investigation was followed by others, such as:
•

Task regarding new technology for pilotage (Uppdrag avseende ny teknik
för lotsning) (Grundevik & Wilske, 2007)

•

Decision Support for Navigation (Anderson, Koester, & Steenberg, 2007)

•

Report pre-study “Piloting from Shore” (Lutzhöft, Dahlman, & Prison,
2008)

The purpose of these investigations can be summarized as investigations into how to
make pilotage more efficient by means of technology, and they all investigated the
possibility of SBP. It is likely that SBP will be performed from a VTS centre, which
most probably will create job opportunities for VTSOs, while it is not far fetched to
make the assumption that these investigations affect the pilot's view of the future in a
negative way.

6.1.2 Information
The need for information exchange between pilots and VTSOs is deemed to be
limited by both respondent groups; from the pilots there were comments like: As a
pilot nothing, we did good before VTS, considering today's technology – VTS is not
necessary and if I need information then I ask for it. This could be interpreted that
pilots are satisfied with the information they have and do not need any further
information. The VTSOs are having similar thoughts on the information exchange,
no special information are needed just be case there is a pilot onboard and we will
treat a ship with a pilot the same way as any other ship These are indications that the
need for information is limited to the standard information needed from every ship
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that enters the VTS area. The notion of information is widely used and the meaning
of information is hard to pin down. According to Davenport and Prusak there is an
old distinction between data, information and knowledge. This distinction is
criticised by them, because they are of the opinion that information is an umbrella
term for all three and serves as the connection between data and knowledge.
However, for the purpose of this dissertation, the proposed definitions made by them
will be used to illuminate the notion of information in this specific context. It is
proposes that Data is simple observations of the world, and in the context of pilotage
and VTS that can be for instance the water level. The next step is Information,
namely data endowed with relevance and purpose, and finally there is Knowledge
which incorporates interpretation and contextualisation by a human (Davenport &
Prusak, 1997). If putting this in the context of the information exchange between
pilots and VTSOs and adding comments like: we have the same source of
information and we have all information our self, it becomes clear that since the
source of data is the same, the information transferred by the VTS is regarded as
unnecessary, and it can even be irritating to receive the information, since it is
already known. The above is true regarding general information; however, both
groups of respondents do acknowledge that in special cases there is a need for
information exchange. Those cases are related to situations where either one of the
groups, in one way or the other, are not able to obtain the data. Such situations could
e.g. be when a pilot informs the VTS that the ship has restricted manoeuvrability due
to loss of steering; the pilot in this case collects the data from his/her position on the
ship and transfers it to the VTS, which in turn transforms it into information that is
broadcast to the ships in the vicinity. Information exchange in the other direction i.e.
from VTS to pilot could be for example if there are reported containers floating in
the water. The VTS has the data and transfers it to the pilot, who will interpret it and
use the information as ground for further decisions. There is further recognized a
need for correct information, which was stressed by the pilots: the information has to
be 100 % correct otherwise it is useless. It seems that the pilots are concerned if they
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can trust the information from the VTS, and base their decisions on it. This is
supported by the SMA customer investigation presented in Chapter 2.4.1, where the
area of information gets a low grade and is deemed to be a prioritized area to be able
to improve the VTS service. This concern is fully appreciated when one thinks of the
context in which the pilots are preforming; they are “out there” close to the action
and close to the result of the used information. Part of this concern might stem from
the fact discussed earlier, that the source of the data is the same e.g. the water level is
checked by the pilot and a short while later the VTS informs the pilot about the water
level. However, there is a difference in the water level perceived by the pilot and the
information gained from the VTS. This can be an issue of concern for the pilot and
might affect the trustworthiness negatively, rendering in the pilot checking the water
level again to be sure that he has the accurate data as a base on further decisions.
The explanation of the difference in water level might be a sudden change in the
water level or that the information is not yet updated on the computer screen in front
of the VTSO. Another situation could be if the VTSO informs the pilot about a ship's
intended route, the pilot receives the information and base the decisions on that. A
few moments later that ship could alter course in an unpredicted way and cause a
close quarter situation for the pilot. The pilot will question the information from the
VTS, however; the VTSO acted on the information known to him without knowing
that the turning ship just received a change of destination and thereby changed the
course, without informing the VTS (these two examples are taken from real
situations). If a pilot is exposed to this kind of situations repetitively without
knowing all the factors behind the information, it is understandable that it will create
a scepticism towards the validity of the information received from VTS.
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6.1.3 Communication
Information and communication are notions that are intertwined with each other.
Communication is to; talk to each other, television, the clothes we are wearing,
newspaper and many other activities (Fiske, 1984, p. 11); moreover, communication
is a necessity within all social interactions (Giddens, 1998, p. 638). The content of
the communication process is usually denoted as information. The notion of
communication is “to talk to” in a process that is mutual; however, it should be
acknowledged that there is a communication form that is one-way, namely the oneway communication process (Palm, 1989, p. 13). The communication process is
described in several ways; however, most of the proposed descriptions contain a
sender, a receiver, channel (medium) and message. In Shannon and Weaver's book
Mathematical Theory of Communication there is one part added called noise source.
The noise source is everything that is added to the signal that is not intended by the
source, which could be technical issues such as noise from a bad connection (Fiske,
1984, p. 18). According to Kaufmann and Kaufmann the source of noise can consist
of filtering the information, selective precipitation, feelings, language, amount of
information, non-verbal signals and time pressure. All these are barriers that stands
between the message as it is perceived by the sender to how the message is
understood by the receiver (G. Kaufmann & A. Kaufmann, 2005, p. 372). Hereunder,
the barriers to communication offered by Kaufmann and Kaufmann will be used in
the context of communication between pilots and VTSOs.
Short, concise and friendly – strait, positive – short, precise and professional are all
comments on how the respondents perceive the communication between the two
groups. It is further perceived as positive, that the communication is following the
SMCP and that it is in English. The fact that all communication is done in English is
a way of overcoming the language barrier identified by Kaufmann & Kaufmann;
moreover, it allows all the ships in the area to be able to understand the conversation.
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We talk the same language is a comment that reoccurs within both respondent
groups; by language it is meant “sea speech”, a way of communicating that is derived
from education and the following experience of a sailor. This phenomena helps the
communication in a positive way. Although the communication is deemed to be
generally good, most of the comments were regarding the technical communications
i.e. how the communication is performed when it occurs. However, when talking
about communication in a broader sense, the picture is not quite the same. There is a
reluctancy to communicate by the pilots, and part of this reluctancy is believed to be
connected with the limited information needed, as discussed in the previous
paragraph. The communication with a VTS can according to the pilots result in a
feeling of irritation and could be disturbing in certain situations; moreover, simple
things as the mode of the day can affect communication; one of the pilots stated that:
sometimes I am short on the VHF, this is when I have a bad day and are fed up with
the reporting procedures, this is a fault by me. This does indicate both that feelings,
or in this case the daily spirit of the pilot and the pilots view of the VTS functions, do
affect communication. Further, it can be seen as the pilots think that there is an overcommunication i.e. the amount of information that is communicated is deemed to
be excessive. The solution for these issues, proposed by the pilots, is to have a silent
VTS system. Time pressure i.e. stress is a factor that is named by both of the groups
as negative with regards to communication.

6.1.4 The relationship and co-operation
The relationship and co-operation are the result of previous discussed themes. Any
glitches in either one of them will be visible within the context of co-operation and
relationship, e.g. it is easy to see that if the communication does not work the cooperation will suffer and in the end the relationship will suffer as well.
During the interviews the notion of relationship and co-operation was perceived as
being very close to each other in meaning, as many of the answers given on the
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question addressing relationship was answered from a co-operation perspective. This
has resulted in some difficulties in separating them during the analysis. However, the
fact that the respondents did not make any bigger differences between the
relationship and the co-operation, can be seen as evidence of how closely connected
the two are. One issue that was raised by both of the groups were the fact that they
seldom meet face to face, this were perceived as an issue that affected the cooperation and relationship in a negative way. The fact that the two groups do not
meet face to face indicates that the interaction between them can be denoted as cooperation over distance. That distance plays an important role in co-operation is a
well known issue. In a survey done by Bradner and Gloria it was concluded that:
the data strongly indicate that the geographic distance between collaborating
and previously unacquainted partners matters. The ability to persuade another
and the willingness to initially cooperate decrease with distance while
deception of another person increases with distance (Bradner & Gloria, 2002,
p. 9).
Further, Bradner and Gloria emphasised the importance of trust, because it is
believed that if there is a sense of trust between the co-operative partners, the
negative effects offered by distance can be defeated. The issue of trust is something
that is an essential factor in the co-operation between pilots and VTSOs, as touched
up on in the previous Chapter 6.1.2 dealing with information, a mistrust between the
two groups can be identified; however, that mistrust seems to be one way, since it is
the pilots that mistrust the VTSOs. In fact, the VTSOs do rank pilots as very
trustworthy, and this is underlined by comments like: the information revived from a
pilot is very trustworthy. The important role of trust is identified in the Report prestudy “Piloting from Shore”. This report is focusing on SBP; however, there are
many similarities to be drawn with the co-operation between pilots and VTS. The
conclusion of the report suggests that the area of focus for further work should be the
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area of communications and trust. Moreover, it is stated that trust is intimately
connected with face to face contact. Another finding made during the research for the
report was that the pilots had observed that there was a lack of trust between the
ship's crew and VTSOs (Lutzhöft et al., 2008).
There are, amongst the VTSOs, an issue that seems to overweight all other issues;
that issue is concerning the lack of communication with pilots. During the interviews
there was numerous comments made about the reluctancy of certain pilots to answer
the VTS when they were called on the VHF; pilots that do not answer the VHF when
we call them - some pilots do not even answer on channel 16 - there are pilots that
don't answer the VHF, this is very arrogant towards us and no answer from ships
with pilot onboard, that is a strange feeling. These statements are underpinned by
incident reports made by VTSOs, and there can be found several reports that deal
with the non-compliance of pilots. As an example there was a ship with a draft of 8,8
meters entering the area, with a pilot onboard. Since the draft of 8,8 meters is far too
deep to transit through the Sound, the VTSO tried to radio the ship on both channel
16 and channel 71 several times without any success. The VTSO then contacted
Lyngby Radio and asked them if they could send a Digital Selective Call (DSC) to
the ship, and in that way establish contact. Lyngby Radio was able to establish
contact, and the pilot informed that the present draft was 7,5 meters, which allows
safe passage through the Sound. The pilot stated that the VTS system is a voluntary
system and that he did not want to contact the VTS; moreover, the pilot did not see
any problem with the AIS that indicated 8.8 meters (Sound VTS, 2009).
This incident indicates that there is a clear reluctancy from the pilot to participate in
the Sound VTS system; further, it also identifies a lack of understanding of how the
VTS works, because it does so by the fact that he did not see any problem with
having an AIS transmitting wrong information. The issue of pilots that will not
participate in the VTS system was demonstrated by not answering when they are
called, seems to be confined to the Danish pilots according to statements made by
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VTSOs and the analysis of incident reports from Sound VTS (it should be noted that
this is an extreme case, and that the majority of the Danish pilots do co-operate in the
best way possible). There might be a parallel to be drawn with regards to the issue of
co-operation over distance. The Swedish pilots are much closer to the VTSOs since
they are stationed in the same building as the VTS, although on another floor, and
this makes it easier for the Swedish pilots to meet the VTSOs in person. Another
issue that might help to explain why there seems to be a more infected relationship
with the Danish pilots could derive from the start up of Sound VTS. For the on the
job training (OJT) the VTSOs are acquired to follow a pilot during a transit pilotage
e.g. a piloted ship that transits the Sound from north to south. The Danish pilots did
not want any VTSOs onboard while they were piloting; however, there were no
problems in joining a Swedish pilot on a ship. The reason for this could be many and
it does probably not reflect the opinion of all the Danish pilots; nevertheless it was
perceived as negative by the VTSOs.
Another area that was put forward during the interviews as a contributing factor to
the relationship and the co-operation was the fact that there could be an element of
competition between the two groups. Comments, such as I have always been positive
towards VTS when I was sailing, but then there were no competition for work - the
competition for work might be a factor that affects the communication - there is a
struggle for power - SMA needs to inform what is going on to reduce the feeling of
competition. Further, the issue of competition is recognized by experts within the
maritime industry, for example the statements made by IMO's both Secretary
General's as presented in Chapter 2. Part of this issue can derive from the fact that
the two parties identify them selves as belonging to two separate groups. A group can
be anything from a few people like for example a family, to vast groups that are
determined by religion. This makes the definition of a group complicated and several
authors have come up with different definitions (Brown, 1988a). According to
Kaufmann and Kaufmann, a social group can be seen as a number of individuals with
common interests of a more permanent sort e.g. common ideals, religion or interests
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and that group members will affect each other by their actions (G. Kaufmann & A.
Kaufmann, 2005). However, the pilots and the VTSOs could be regarded as one
group since they have a common interest in safety and they do affect each other.
However, in several definitions of groups there is a criterion that interaction is made
face to face (Johnsson & Johnsson as cited in (Hwang, 2005, p. 306). Following this
it is not far fetched to make the assumption that pilots and VTSOs despite the fact
that they have many similarities, can be viewed as two groups. It was also quite
obvious during the interviews that pilots and VTSOS did see themselves as two
separate groups. Brown puts forward that the mere fact of belonging to two different
groups will affect the view of the other group. Brown goes on and highlights two
social psychological processes that can explain the intergroup problem. These two
are social categorization and social identification. Social categorization can be
described as how people order their social environment. By dividing the social
environment into categories, it will help individuals to define who they are i.e. social
identification. These two processes can explain that individuals get some of their
self-worth from belonging to a certain group, and the better that group is, compared
to other groups, the higher self-worth the individual will feel. All this together
contributes to a competition between groups (Brown, 1988b). The competition
between groups will quite naturally have an impact on co-operation and the
relationship.
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7 Conclusion and recommendations
Pilot services and VTS services are two very similar services; they both aim at
increasing safety by providing information and assistance to ships. In the case of
Sound VTS and Sound Pilotage the persons that render that service are also similar
with regards to e.g. professional background, education and training. The overall
impression is that the interaction between pilots and VTSOs are regarded as being
limited but satisfactory by most of the interviewed respondents. Although the
interaction between the two groups work without problems most of the time, issues
such as a strong feeling of group belonging, lack of trust and lack of communication
have been identified. These issues clearly have a negative impact on the interaction
and do affect the services in a negative way. In the quest for gaining knowledge of
how to improve the services, the negative issues found have been the main focal
point of this work, and therefore it has painted a rather black picture of the
interaction between pilots and VTSOs. However, it should be stressed that the
interaction is well functioning in most cases and do thereby contribute to a safer sea.
The analysis indicates that many of the issues found are derived from poor
interpersonal relations and a strong group feeling. Further, the fast developing
technology is an issue that affects the need for interaction. The pilots stated that the
information obtained by the VTS was already known to them, and therefore it is felt
unnecessary to receive it once more, and it can even be a source of disturbance while
performing their tasks. According to the author, VTS has to take this into account
when developing working procedures. The fact that pilots most often have the
information that they need could also serve as part of the explanation of the result
derived from the customer investigation ordered by SMA. The ship's officers do not
have access to the same information sources as the pilots do and do therefore find the
information from the VTS useful. The incitements for co-operation between the two
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services were deemed to be limited under normal circumstances by the interviewed
respondents; however, both groups do acknowledge that there are situations where
they both could gain on enhanced co-operation. However, it is believed that to be
able to do that in an effective way the hinder proposed by the social issues has to be
addressed. The competitive group feeling has to be abolished and replaced with a
feeling of being a team that works towards the same goal. To be able to facilitate
such co-operation the individuals have to have a genuine trust in each other. The
issue of trust is a central issue because if there is no trust the interaction will not have
any solid ground to grow in. As described by Lutzhöft et al., trust is closely
connected with face to face contact, to meet each other in person. This is also
brought forward by the VTSOs and the pilots as they think that if they were to meet
in person it would be easier to co-operate. One way to achieve this could be to train
pilots and VTSOs together, since this will provide a better understanding of how the
other service functions and it will also be an excellent chance to get to know each
other and thereby building up the trust. Moreover, this combined training will be
time and cost saving. If there is success in building up the trust and thereby achieving
a team feeling, it might open the road to involve the VTS more actively in Bridge
Resource Management (BRM) onboard ships. If the VTS are acting as a member of
the BRM team then the two systems will complement each other in an effective way,
and thereby the level of safety will rise considerably.
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